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ENEMY 

JAPAN 


Prepared by the 

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 




FOREWORD 


In mobilizing ourselves for the final push of the war — the long, hard 
push against Japan — it is important for Americans to recognize two hard 
realities: the Japanese are a tough enemy, and they are a distant enemy. 

They are tough because they have a tough army and navy, a big industrial 
potential, a vast manpower reserve, a belt-tightened civilian mobilization, 
all welded as a single weapon of war by leaders who are ruthless, deter¬ 
mined, and despotic. 

Distance in warfare is to be translated in terms of supply lines, the turn¬ 
around time of cargo vessels, the availability of ports and of big bases 
close to the enemy. The vast, empty miles of the Pacific have to be con¬ 
quered before we can come to grips with the Japanese enemy in large 
numbers — a thing we have not done despite our outpost only 350 miles 
from the Japanese homeland. 

And lastly, we have to keep fighting until the Japanese admit complete 
and utter defeat because we must not give the Japanese warlords a chance 
to plot another sneak attack, another war of conquest, another Pearl 
Harbor, Nanking, or Hong Kong. 

This book is an attempt to give American writers the knowledge of the 
Japanese, their war aims, and their ideology that will strengthen American 
determination to fight the Japanese to the finish. 

This book has two major objectives: 

FIRST To inform the American people of the enormity of the job 
ahead in defeating Japan. Because many Americans are un¬ 
aware of the strength of Japan and are now confident of their 
own power, there is grave danger of a “let down” on the home 
front. Specifically, people should be encouraged to 

(a) Stay on their war jobs until released. 

(b) Continue to purchase War Bonds. 

(c) Continue to observe all wartime regulations. 

SECOND To inform the American people that a negotiated peace would 
be nothing more than a pause between wars, while Japan re¬ 
organized for a more bitter, costly struggle. President Truman 
has stated clearly that we demand “unconditional surrender” 
from Japan. She now has conquered territories which can pro¬ 
vide her with an abundance of raw materials and a huge reser¬ 
voir of manpower. Once organized we would face a far more 
formidable enemy than Japan of today. 


SEP 12 ' s ' ;5 


CCl A A 498645 


Page 

1 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 


I. Gumbotsu—The Japanese Enemy. 

The Nature of the Japanese Enemy—Aggressive Expansion— 

The New Order In Asia—Who the Gumbatsu are—How the 
Gumbatsu Work—Government and Religion Inseparable— 

The Overthrow of the Shogunate—Japan’s Feudalists. 

II. Japan's War Aim—Greater East Asia . 6 

Japan’s War Aim—Psychological Warfare—Greater East Asia 
Ministry—Japan’s Totalitarian Party—Japan in the Philip¬ 
pines-Occupied China and Manchuria—-Japan’s New Order. 

III. The Forger of the Sword: Japan's Industry. 12 

Development and structure of Japan’s Industry—Japanese In¬ 
dustry Geared for War—Japan’s Industrial Manpower— 

Raw Materials and Resources—Coal—Iron and Steel—Oil— 


Rubber—Railways—Electric Power—Food. 

IV. The Wielders of the Sword: Japan's Army IS 

The Japanese Soldier—Japanese Military Training—Organiza¬ 
tion and Structure of the Japanese Army—Japanese Infantry 
Weapons—Size of Japan’s Army. 

V. The Wielders of the Sword: Japan's Navy 17 


Growth of Japan’s Fleet—Losses in Personnel—The Japanese 
Sailor—Officers—Underestimation by the West a Japanese 
Military Weapon. 

VI. The Japanese Home Front. 20 

Japan’s Total Mobilization—Total Rationing—Food—Cloth¬ 
ing—Fuel and Other Rationed Goods—Japan’s Total Labor 
Draft—Wages and Living Costs—Civilian Defense and 
Evacuation—Other Wartime Measures—Hardships Are the 
Path to Victory. 


VII. Problems of Fighting the Pacific War. 23 

Distance is Also an Enemy—The Effect of Germany’s Defeat— 
Production and Logistics. 

VIII. Some General Conclusions. 24 


Japan’s Main Forces Must Still be Encountered—The Japanese 
Navy is Still Dangerous—Japanese Civilians vs. U. S. Civil¬ 
ians—The Japanese Nation Fashioned for War—Japan Still 
Hopes to Win. 

IX. Selected Reading on Japan. 25 

Library Collections on Japan. 












Prepared by the 

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 


Based on data furnished by 

THE WAR DEPARTMENT 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 


Copyright, 1945, Public Affairs Press 
2153 Florida Ave., Washington, D. C. 


CUMBATSU—THE JAPANESE ENEMY 



The Nature of the Japanese Enemy 

Gumbatsu is a Japanese word which symbol¬ 
izes the core of Japanese aggression. It means 
"military clique” but is used here to refer to the 
present-day coalition of militarists, industrialists, 
and office-holders who are Japan’s real rulers. 

The Gumbatsu have bent the Japanese 
people to their will and they are now seeking to 
enslave one billion people of Asia—HALF THE 
ENTIRE POPULATION OF THE WORLD. 

This is their war aim, stated in plain language: 
to create a single economic empire in the Far 
East under Japanese domination. The Gum¬ 
batsu run Japan and they would run what they 
call the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 
They will use any means necessary to attain it 
and they will try to destroy anyone who stands 
in their way. 

The Greater East Asia War, as they call it, has 
had the support of the Japanese people. There 
is no doubt about that. But the Greater East 
Asia War has been held up to the shopkeepers, 
small industrialists, farmers, and wage-workers of 
Japan as a means of getting land, jobs and trade 
for their sons—land, jobs and trade for the "One 
Hundred Million” at the expense of the "One 
Billion” peoples of Japan’s New Order. 

The Gumbatsu planned the sneak attack on 
Pearl Harbor and sanctioned the Death March of 
Bataan. They stood by while Nanking and Hong 
Kong were sacked and raped. These are reasons, 
enough for Americans to fight and avenge their 
comrades and allies. But there are other reasons 
too. 

Aggressive Expansion 

Pearl Harbor, Bataan, and Nanking were only 
steps in aggressive expansion that began after the 


Gumbatsu came to power. Here is the time¬ 
table : 

1895 Formosa 

1904 Kwarttung 

1910 Korea 

1919 The Mandated Islands 

1931 Manchuria 

1932-44 Occupied China 
Indo-China 
Thailand 
Burma 

Netherlands East Indies 
The Philippines 

The Japanese never filled out the rest-of the 
timetable. The United Nations stopped that, be¬ 
ginning with the Battle of the Coral Sea. But 
their propagandists have filled it in for us. They 
say they are fighting a war to create the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In it, they 
propose to include all the peoples of India and 
China, besides the countries they already have 
overrun. Every day the Japanese radio paints 
a dream picture for the peoples of Asia and the 
Japanese home audience. All the countries of 
Asia will be "liberated” as free and independent 
peoples. Japan will merely "co-ordinate” such 
activities as national defense, foreign relations, 
and the development of natural resources. 



The New Order in Asia 

The Japanese war aim—to develop in Asia an 
economic empire similar to Hitler’s New Order in 
Europe—together with the tight control of the 
Gumbatsu over the Japanese people—shows 


1 



that when we fight Japan we are fighting a social 
system similar to Nazism and Fascism. 

The similarity extends into the propaganda 
field. Like the Nazis, the Gumbatsu regard 
themselves as supermen, chosen for a divine mis¬ 
sion, and use racial themes in order to win sup¬ 
port from their allies and whip up resentment 
against their enemies. 

The Gumbatsu tell the peoples of Asia they 
are fighting a war of liberation; that if the races 
of East Asia unite they can "throw off the yoke 
of imperialism.” Their theme is "Asia for the 
Asiatics,” and imperialism is cleverly identified 
with "white” and "non-Asiatic,” or "Anglo- 
American.” 

That this is a relatively disguised form of racism 
appears when the real jingoists begin to speak. 
In March 1941, the Greater East Asia League was 
organized, an amalgam of some 50 patriotic ex¬ 
pansionist societies. A great mass meeting was 
held which took an oath "to eliminate the root 
evil in Greater East Asia—the whites, in line with 
Hakko Ichiu” the Japanese religious and 
mythological doctrine that all nations belong 
under one roof, the Emperor’s. 

If we were to stand idly by and let the Japanese 
achieve their war aim they would be the masters 
of a fortress Asia which contains one of the most 
powerful combinations of human and natural re¬ 
sources in the world. Half the world’s popula¬ 
tion and immense reserves of coal, iron, timber, 
petroleum, rubber, tin, tungsten, antimony, 
chrome ore, bauxite, zinc, copper, quinine, fats 
and oils, animal and vegetable fibres—every¬ 
thing needed to wage war—economic war as well 
as military war. We would have no choice ex¬ 
cept to do business with them on their own terms, 
and we know that there never would be an end 
to their demands. We decided some time ago 
that we wouldn’t do business with Nazis or Fas¬ 
cists. You can’t do business with the Gumbatsu 
either, except at pistol point. 



Who are the Gumbatsu? 

Early European influences in Japan were first 
felt in the southern and western islands. In 1868 


the hereditary feudal leaders of the. local clans in 
the southern and western part of Japan over¬ 
threw what was then the ruling clan, the Toku- 
gaiva, and "restored” the Emperor as a temporal 
as well as a spiritual ruler. In this struggle for 
power the Satsuma and Choshu clans were 
victorious. The Satsuma leaders got an inside 
track on the Navy, the Choshu an inside track on 
the army which even to the present day has 
helped them exercise the principal control over 
Japan’s armed forces. 

Allied with them today are a number of im¬ 
portant industrialists. Many of them are world 
famous, for they own shipping lines, mills, stores, 
newspapers, banks, factories, mines, and other 
establishments. Nothing quite like these indus¬ 
trial combinations exists in European countries, 
for they are family holding corporations in which 
control passes from generation to generation. 
Naturally these companies favor expansion and 
Japanese control in East Asia, for the economic 
exploitation of the occupied countries would be 
in their hands. Being business men of the 
"New Order” they would prefer to get this con¬ 
trol without having to fight a war for it. But 
we know only too well to what lengths they 
are prepared to go if the "One Billion People” 
won’t acquiesce peacably. 

In modem Japan these ruling families have 
found it advisable to have a family member in the 
civil service. It is natural and inevitable that a 
country which has been industrialized rapidly 
would need State assistance in developing large 
national projects such as railroads and munitions. 
Representatives of the big family combines have 
been called in to handle these matters. Hence, 
the armv and navy, business and government all 
work together. 

There are other components of the Gumbatsu. 
Large landholders are a part of it. Japan is a 
country of 75 million people in an area about the 
size of California. Land has been divided and 
redivided until a man doesn’t have enough land 
to work to feed his family. When his sons grow 
up they get an even smaller piece. Under these 
circumstances a man turns to a money-lender— 
mortgages his land. In time, he loses it. To¬ 
day, many of Japan’s farmers are share croppers 
and tenant farmers. The rent and the interest 
they pay on their debts often funnel to a group of 
absentee landlords. 


2 




In the days of the so-called ''liberal” govern¬ 
ments in Japan, the absentee landlords were the 
most conservative and least expansionist of 
Japanese leaders. They were founders of the 
political parties and for many vears operated as a 
check on the territorial-expansionist aims of the 
war lords. But today the former political parties 
are dissolved and all have been squeezed into one. 

Last in the list of important groups which con¬ 
trol Japan are the members of the Imperial House¬ 
hold ministry. Their influence spreads wide and 
penetrates deep. The Imperial Household is a 
heavy investor in industrial developments of 
national importance. In the days of Meiji, most 
large-scale national industrial projects were begun 
with capital furnished by the Japanese Govern¬ 
ment. Today, tight control is exercised over im¬ 
portant wartime development projects through 
the voting power of stock held in the name of the 
Imperial Household represented by Ministers of 
State appointed for the purpose. 

Taken together, these groups are the Cum- 
batsU/ a closely interlocking clique of expansion¬ 
ists and imperialist-minded men who control the 
"One Hundred Million” people of Japan and 
Korea for their own benefit and profit, and now 
seek to control the "One Billion People” of Greater 
East Asia for the benefit and profit of Japan. 

How the Gumbatsu Work 

They exercise their control through political 
machinery devised to operate for their benefit, 
through economic controls which make certain 
those benefits will be perpetuated from one gen¬ 
eration to the next, and through propaganda 
controls which insure that the Japanese masses 
will continuously adopt the only attitude required 
of them—acquiescence. 

The political controls are based on a theory of 
government which provides that all political acts 
are made in the name of the Emperor. All power, 
legislative, judicial, and executive, emanates 
from the Emperor. The Japanese "Diet” con¬ 
sists of the House of Peers and a House of Repre¬ 
sentatives. At the present time, it has little 
power in its own name. The cabinet is respon¬ 
sible to the Emperor, not to the Diet. Budgets 
are submitted to the Diet for approval, but if 
the Diet does not approve the budget, the budget 
of the previous year is automatically used. 

The economic privileges and the political pow¬ 
ers of the Gumbatsu might not be theirs in 
perpetuity save for one thing. By the theory of 


the Emperor’s divinity an act of opposition can 
be made an act of treason or near-blasphemy. 
Respect for the Emperor as a divine person is 
engendered in the growing child by his participa¬ 
tion in the national cult, home training and his 
formal schooling. If, despite this training and 
tradition someone asserts his political opposition 
there is the Thought-Control Bureau to see that 
his words are not spread too far and the secret 
police to see that he doesn’t get about too freely. 



Government and Religion Inseparable 

In Japanese theory the Emperor is a descend¬ 
ant of the Sun Goddess and all his people share, 
to a lesser degree, in his divinity. The theory of 
the Emperor’s divinity i6 part of Japanese folk¬ 
lore and tradition and is officially made a part 
of the growing child’s outlook. The Education 
Ministry controls the curriculum and personnel 
of all schools in Japan and determines the con¬ 
tent of text-books. The Thought-Control Bu¬ 
reau has the power of censorship over books and 
magazines whether they are published in Japan 
or imported. Through these schools and through 
the practice of State Shinto, Japanese children 
are taught the supremacy of the State over the 
individual, just as in Nazi and Fascist countries. 
They are taught that the individual’s full respon¬ 
sibility is realized only in sacrifice—if necessary, 
sacrifice of the individual’s life to "keep the 
Emperor’s mind at ease.” 

The majority of Japanese are Buddhist and 
nearly all practice a simple form of ancestor 
worship similar to that found throughout most 
of the East. But the official propagandists have 
taken the simple religious practices of the home 
and by channeling them through the official 
machinery of the State have developed the sep¬ 
arate national cult. State Shinto—a very different 
thing. In State Shinto the simple religious observ- 
ance of the home have been magnified and glori¬ 
fied into national patriotic-religious demonstra¬ 
tions in the name of the national spirit as exempli¬ 
fied by the Emperor. 


3 



Growth of Shinto 

According to Japanese teaching, the first Emperor 
was named Jimmu. He was the great-grandson of 
the Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu O-Mikami, who an- 
noved by the bickerings of the earth-people, sent 
Jimmu to bring peace and unity, and rule over 
the earth as she ruled in heaven. 

Jimmu arrived in Japan and founded the 
"Godlv” Japanese nation for the specific purpose 
of fulfilling the divine injunction of the Sun 
Goddess to conquer and rule the world. 

It was not until the reign of Emperor Kotoku 
in the seventh century A. D. that Japan’s Em¬ 
peror system really came into being. The early 
Japanese had already developed a legend to 
explain their presence on the islands. It was a 
simple and flattering answer for a primitive 
people who worshipped their ancestors and a 
multitude of nature gods and demons. They 
were of divine origin. They were in Japan 
because the gods had sent them there. 

Buddhist missionaries, coming from China, 
were welcomed at Emperor Kotoku’s court and 
were given every opportunity to expound their 
teachings. In addition to Buddhism, which was 
accepted by the Japanese side by side with their 
more primitive Shinto-cult of nature-ancestor 
worship, these missionaries brought the written 
language of China and much of her culture. 

Soon the Japanese chief, no longer a mere 
warrior-prince, adopted the title of Tenno , 
"Divine Ruler,” and retired to a palace where he 
devoted his time to enjoying all the pleasant 
things a "God on Earth” might desire. In the 
Chinese court tradition, the Emperor was com¬ 
pletely isolated from his people, and his authority 
was delegated through the ministers of his court. 
It logicaljy followed that this authority soon 
became Japan’s prize political plum, to be seized 
and held by the strongest and most ruthless 
feudal factions. 

Since that time the Emperor has existed only 
to give "divine sanction” to the acts of whichever 
clique was powerful enough to hold the reins. 
In fact, during the reign of the Tokugawa 
Shoguns who were overthrown in 1868 after 


reigning more than 200 years, the Emperor was a 
palace prisoner, often hungry and without even 
an adequate wardrobe. 

Today the Emperor is only a political instru¬ 
ment. His importance and his usefulness to the 
Gumbatsu derive from his religious and symbolic 
meaning to the Japanese populace—a meaning 
the Gumbotsu have thoroughly exploited. 

To the Japanese masses, the Emperor today is 
an exalted person—a living representative of the 
gods. He is the high-priest of the separate State 
Shinto cult. He is the embodied symbol of 
national unity and the bearer, in direct line from 
his ancestor Jimmu, of the Sun Goddess’ "divine 
injunction” to conquer and rule over the world. 
The Emperor is also the funnel through which 
the gods transmit their will and benevolence. As 
such, he is the fountainhead of all authority, 
which he does not use directly, but delegates to 
those who have official "access to the throne.” 



The Overthrow of the Shogunate 

When Commodore Perry landed on Kurihama 
Beach in 1853, he found Japan divided among 
many hostile feudal clans. All were more or less 
loyal to the ruling Shogun, a hereditary military 
dictator, who kept his subjects in line by a shrewd 
combination of politics, force, and a hostage 
system. The Emperor was a palace prisoner, 
shorn of all political power, and used by the 
Shogun as a politico-religious symbol. 

The armed retainers of the feudal barons were 
the Samurai, a warrior caste who pledged fealty 
to a particular overlord in exchange for a yearly 
allowance of rice. 

For. some two centuries the Shoguns of the 
ruling Tokugawa clan had carefully isolated Japan 
from the outside world. But with Perry’s ships, 
the expanding west broke the walls of Japanese 
isolation, opening that nation to the flood of new 
ideas and mechanical progress. 

As a direct result of these new influences from 
the west, Japan experienced a revolution. It 
began with a civil war in 1867 and did not fend 
until the Shogunate wa6 overthrown and the 
Emperor was "restored” to temporal as well as 


4 







spiritual power. Through this upheaval the 
heretofore despised merchant-class emerged as 
one of the dominant elements in Japan. 

The new Emperor, Meiji, surrounded him¬ 
self with an outstanding group of minds as 
advisors, familiar with Western thought. Japan 
took on the form of a liberal monarchy with 
a dominant middle-class. But this turned out 
to be an illusion. 

Japan's Feudalists 

Actually, Japanese feudalism was never de¬ 
stroyed. The balance of power shifted, so that 
merchants, who were a despised class under the 
Shogunate, eventually became a respected and 
powerful element in the new society. The rise 
of a merchant class was inevitable when Western 
industrial technology and Western trade goods 
were introduced. But as far as the overthrow of 
the Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor 
were concerned, the change meant only that the 
feudal lords who were on the outside during the 
Tokugawa regime now were on the inside. 

Japan thus became a dangerous anachronism. 
She adopted Western industrial methods while, 
at the same time. Western liberal and democratic 
ideas were ruthlessly filtered out. 

She stepped from the Dark Age into the 


Machine Age without a parallel change in her 
thought-patterns and culture. Such a feudal 
society, intensely nationalistic, suddenly endowed 
with the latest industrial techniques, was bound 
to be explosive. 

Japan’s population was never permitted to 
develop and enjoy any real democracy. The 
peasantry, which forms the bulk of Japan’s popu¬ 
lation, had to carry a staggering burden of con¬ 
stantly increasing taxes. What this burden 
means in cold figures can be shown in a statement 
released by the Imperial Agricultural Society 
shortly before the war. Japanese farmholders, 
according to the Society, paid from 31 percent to 
50 percent of their total annual incomes in taxes, 
while manufacturers paid only 18 percent. 

This machine-age feudalism has kept Japan’s 
farmers, workers, and small tradesmen from shar¬ 
ing the new wealth created by Japan’s industrializa¬ 
tion, and has prevented them from enlarging their 
political participation in the fashion of the West¬ 
ern democracies. Because the masses of people 
are indoctrinated with docility, and are politically 
impotent, the Gumbatsu are free to expand 
their power without restriction from below. 
Whatever voice of opposition there may be in 
Japan will have no opportunity to speak or carry 
influence until the Gumbatsu have been stripped 
of all power and position. 


646663 °- 


5 



On November 5th and 6th, 1943, the Japanese 
Government arranged a six-nation conference in 
Tokyo, followed by a mass rally of 100,000 
Japanese. To the conference came the heads of 
government of Japan’s puppet regimes: Wang 
Ching-wei of Occupied China, Chang Ching-hui 
of Manchuria, Ba Maw of Burma, Prince Varn- 
vaidya Voravarn of Thailand, and Laurel, the 
Philippine quisling. Subhas Chandra Bose of 
the "Provisional Government of Free India” and 
representatives from Malay were also present. 
The host and chairman was Tojo, then prime 
minister of Japan. 

The outcome of these puppets’ discussions was a 
joint declaration, which the Japanese radio has 
since referred to as the "Greater East Asia Decla¬ 
ration.” This document was intended to be 
Japan’s answer to the Atlantic Charter. It is 
also Japan’s major instrument of propaganda and 
psychological warfare in the Far East. 

The purpose of this part of the program book is 
to compare the promises of this declaration with 
the actualities of Japan’s exploitation of Occupied 
Asia—to show, in short, that the Gumbatsu 
technique of rule outside Japan is the same as the 
Gumbatsu technique of rule inside Japan. 

Psychological Warfare 

These are the main points of the Greater East 
Asia Declaration: 

"It is a basic principle for the establishment of 
world peace, that the nations of the world each 
have a proper place, and enjoy prosperity in 
common through mutual aid and assistance. 
The United States and the British Empire have, 
in seeking their own prosperity, oppressed other 
nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia 
they have indulged in insatiable aggression and 
exploitation and sought to satisfy their inordinate 
ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally 
they came to menace seriously the stability of 
East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war. 

6 


"The countries of Greater East Asia . . . under¬ 
take to cooperate toward prosecuting the war of 
Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, 
liberating their region from the yoke of British- 
American domination and insuring their self¬ 
existence and self-defense, in constructing a 
Greater East Asia in accordance with the follow¬ 
ing principles: 

"Common Prosperity (1) The countries of 
Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation, 
will insure stabilization . . . and construct an 
order of common prosperity and well-being based 
on justice. 

"Mutual Assistance (2) The countries of 
Greater East Asia will insure the fraternity of 
nations in their region by respecting one another’s 
sovereignty and independence, and practicing 
mutual assistance and amity. 

"Respect of Traditions (3) The countries 
of Greater East Asia will respect one another’s 
traditions and develop the creative faculties of 
each race. 

"Economic Development (4) The coun¬ 
tries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accel¬ 
erate their economic development through close 
cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to 
promote thereby the general prosperity of their 
region. 

"Abolition of Racial Discrimination ( 5 ) 

The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate 
friendly relations with all of the countries of the 
world and work for the abolition of racial dis¬ 
crimination, the promotion of cultural inter¬ 
course, and the opening of resources throughout 
the world and contribute thereby to the progress 
of mankind.” 

This declaration is a propaganda document 
which plays skillfully upon the yearnings of Asi¬ 
atic peoples for independence, and their feeling of 
racial discrimination. At the same time, the 
declaration cloaks Japan’s ruthless domination of 



Occupied Asia. Japan’s deed undoes her word. 
Nevertheless, such propaganda is potent psycho¬ 
logical warfare in the Far East. It is one of 
Japan’s strengths which we should recognize 
when we guage our enemy. 

Below is an example selected from the tens of 
thousands of words the Japanese Home and 
Empire Radio Service broadcasts every day. 
This particular example is taken from Radio 
Tokyo’s news broadcast of the mass rally follow¬ 
ing the Greater East Asia Conference. A 
resolution was adopted at the rally, of which this 
is the final paragraph. 

"Here at this juncture, the whole of Greater 
East Asia shall prosecute the Greater East Asia 
War to a successful conclusion by advancing its 
total strength and by further joining in the com¬ 
mon mission under unshakeable conviction of 
sure victory; and shall not allow the dominating 
power of America and Britain to exist in Greater 
East Asia again, thereby looking forward to the 
establishment of a new world order.” 

Greater East Asia Ministry 

To build a sphere of influence in the Far East 
is Japan’s main war aim. To enlist cooperation 
of Far Eastern nations she has created puppet 
regimes. To insure effective prosecution of the 
war, however, she does not rely on puppet 
governments, but on her government depart¬ 
ments together with the army and navy. 

The principal responsibility for insuring proper 
contribution to the war by the "independent” 
countries is entrusted to the Greater East Asia 
Ministry. 

On November 1, 1942, Prime Minister Tojo 
reorganized the whole framework of colonial ad¬ 
ministration, vesting full powers in the Greater 
East Asia Ministry. The real intentions of the 
Gumbatsu are revealed by the organizations 
the new ministry replaced, and by its personnel. 
The duties of the new ministry were formerly in 
the hands of the Manchurian Affairs Board, the 
Asia Development Board, and other similar 
organizations. The first minister was Kazuo 
Aoki, formerly vice-director of the Manchurian 
Affairs Board; once president of the Cabinet 
Planning Board; once supreme economic advisor 
to the puppet Nanking regime in China. The 
magazine Sozo described him in December 1942, 
as, “the long war type, of man, who was nick¬ 
named ‘Tenacious Turtle’ at school, with a sour 


face that has forgotten how to smile, with a 
mouth hard as flint that never utters a joke or an 
idle word, with an undersized body that scampers 
around like a mouse, and with a burning zeal for 
work.” 

Since July 1944, the positions of Greater East 
Asia minister and foreign minister have been held 
concurrently. Some idea of the nature of Japan’s 
interest in this sphere may be obtained by 
analyzing the organization of the Greater East 
Asia Ministry. There are separate bureaus for 
Manchurian affairs, China affairs, and the south¬ 
ern regions. Individual bureaus handle trade 
and research problems, to say nothing of the 
interesting bureau which is responsible for "Mili¬ 
tary Training for Greater East Asia.” 

The true nature of "co-prosperity” appears, 
however, in the working agencies of the Ministry. 
They are listed below. 

East Asia Development Board. 

East Asia Deliberative Council. 

Southern Regions Development Company. 

East Asia Cultural Research Institute. 

Central Association for Overseas Japanese. 

Greater East Asia Training Institute. 

Southern Regions Natural Science Insti¬ 
tute. 

Japan's totalitarian party 

In 1940 Prince Konoye, then Japan’s Prime 
Minister, forced the existing political parties and 
many other organizations to disband in favor of 
a new, totalitarian organization, the Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association. Early in 1945, under 
the threat of American attack and because of 
internal political stresses, the IRAA and its politi¬ 
cal branch were replaced by a new, though simi¬ 
lar national organization called the Greater Japan 
Political Association. 

But for nearly 5 years the Imperial Rule As¬ 
sistance Association was the Gumbatsu's main 
instrument of domestic propaganda in Japan 
and psychological warfare in the rest of Greater 
East Asia. The IRAA took under its wing the 
long-established neighborhood associations and 
made them responsible for enforcing civilian 
mobilization decrees. In the "independent” coun¬ 
tries of Greater East Asia, branches of the IRAA 
were organized in nearly every Japanese com¬ 
munity. Through subsidiary organizations of 
youth, women, patriotic societies, religious orders, 
and others, enthusiasm for Greater East Asia was 
whipped up. 


7 


Through the Greater East Asia Ministry and 
the IRAA, the Gumbatsu extended its influence 
and controls into the "independent” countries of 
Greater East Asia. Bearing in mind the promises 
of the Greater East Asia Declaration let us 
examine the record of Japan in two areas of 
special interest to Americans: the Philippines and 
China. 



Japan in the Philippines 

On the occasion of the induction of his Cabinet, 
March 8, 1945, President Sergio Osmena of the 
Philippines said, "The Japanese occupation of the 
Philippines was not only a military invasion. It 
was also an ideological and cultural invasion. It 
was an attempt to foist on our people the invader’s 
totalitarian ideas, his spirit of conquest and 
exploitation, his theories of the superiority of the 
Yamato race, his way of life.” 

The release of American and Filipino prisoners 
and internees from Japanese concentration camps 
has shown all of us the results of purposeful 
brutality and starvation. Lesser hardships have 
been suffered by all residents of the Philippines 
as a result of soaring prices, currency inflation, 
and severe food shortages resulting from im¬ 
pounded transportation and reduction in trade. 

Japanese economic policy in the Philippines 
was aimed primarily at utilizing Philippine re¬ 
sources for the prosecution of the war. With 
this the Japanese cleverly coupled the psycholog¬ 
ical warfare weapon of "independence.” 

The Japanese Military Administration ran the 
Islands from January 2, 1942, to October 14, 
1943. It took over and operated coconut oil 
plants, large sawmills, sugar centrals, cigarette 
factories, basic mines, railways, telephone systems 
and power plants. And when the Philippines 
were granted "independence” in October, 1943, 
the Japanese kept control of these enterprises, 
through a clause provided in the new constitution. 

The Japanese salvaged and repaired about two- 
thirds of the interisland steamers and took them 
away for use elsewhere, thus leaving the country 
virtually without commercial inlerisland trans¬ 


portation. All that remained were small wooden 
sailing ships. 

Having taken over the operation of important 
producing establishments, the Japanese then in¬ 
troduced a policy of "economic self-sufficiency.” 
Responsibility for this development was placed on 
the puppet government, which was then required 
to be guided by Japanese advisors who set pro¬ 
duction goals and crop quotas based on the needs 
of the Japanese occupation forces. 

By this device the Japanese were enabled to 
live off the country, thus depriving Filipinos, par¬ 
ticularly those living in cities, of much-needed 
food and other goods. In rural districts the food 
situation was somewhat better, but there was and 
is a great shortage of consumer goods. Inflation 
and black markets have naturally developed. 

Additional hardships were caused by the Japan¬ 
ese labor policy and the sugar and textile program. 
Labor for all needed military construction was 
conscripted by the military government, leaving 
the puppet Filipino government to cope with the 
unemployment and distress caused by economic 
breakdown. 

The sugar program is an example of Japanese 
ruthless economic programming without reference 
to Filipino distress. The Japanese first diverted 
40 percent of sugar acreage to cotton. The re¬ 
maining 60 percent was divided on a basis of 20 
percent for domestic sugar needs and 40 percent 
for the manufacture of fuel alcohol. There was 
thus no provision for the export of sugar, formerly 
an important source of income. 

But the Japanese fuel requirements increased. 
All centrifugal sugar was converted into alcohoi, 
leaving the Filipinos only the sugar produced in 
small local mills. 

Financial manipulations have been equally 
ruthless. European owned banks were liquidated 
by the Japanese. Large quantities of military 
bank notes were circulated, contributing to price 
inflation. Price controls were attempted but were 
ineffective in the face of the acute economic 
distress. 

Due to the splendid spirit of the Filipinos the 
Japanese were never able to raise a local army and 
were obliged to maintain large local forces to 
combat the guerilleros, the Filipino soldiers and 
civilians who took to the hills to harass the 
Japanese garrison. 

Philippine "Independence" 

Japan first held out "independence” as bait to 
the Philippines to induce the country to abandon 


8 




resistance. In January 1942, Tojo, then Prime 
Minister, said, "If the Filipinos would understand 
the real intentions of Nippon and offer to cooper¬ 
ate, Japan would give them independence.” 

In succeeding months, Tokyo issued propaganda 
appeals to "brother Filipinos now in hiding in the 
hills and in the mountains” and asked them to 
"realize that by their own activities they are 
hindering and delaying independence.” In July 
1942, the Japanese, faced by harsh necessity and 
convinced that nominal independence would en¬ 
courage cooperation with the invaders, set the 
machinery in motion by appointing a preparatory 
commission headed by Laurel, which drafted a 
constitution. This constitution was never ratified 
by the people. DOM El, the official Japanese 
news agency said, "Because of the necessary 
time to submit the constitution to a direct vote of 
the people, the Kalibapi, which is serving in the 
capacity of a people’s association was entrusted 
with the ratification by their representatives 
attending the General Assembly.” On October 
14, 1943, independence was proclaimed by Laurel. 
The Manila radio broadcast the rules for this 
event. "Placards announcing slogans, petitions, 
protest and the like will be prohibited.” The 
Manila radio also reminded the people that 
"Mavor Guinto has already issued the necessary 
instructions so that the ceremony may be carried 
out with appropriate respect and veneration for 
the Japanese National Flag . . .” 

A pact was signed at the same time as the new 
"Constitution” and the "Declaration of Independ¬ 
ence.” It provided, "The two countries (Japan 
and the Philippines) will closely cooperate in 
matters political, economic and military for the 
successful prosecution of the war of Greater East 
Asia. The Philippines will provide all kinds of 
facilities for the military actions to be undertaken 
by Japan.” 

As in Japan, the Gumbatsu created in the 
Philippines, a totalitarian political organization. 
The Philippine model was called the Kalibapi, 
which is a contraction of the Tagalog words for 
"National Service Organization for the New 
Phillipines.” It was a faithful duplicate of the 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association, complete 
with women’s auxiliary, youth corps, religious 
representation and neighborhood associations. 
Laurel, the collaborationist President, was also 
President of the Kalibapi, and Aquino, speaker 
of the puppet legislature, was the vice president. 


Control of Religion 

In the Philippines, as elsewhere, the Japanese 
placed all religious organization under the control 
of the Religious Section of the Japanese Military 
Administration. The section was a specially 
trained group of Japanese including "Catholic 
Priests,” "Protestant Clergymen,” "Y. M. C. A. 
Secretaries,” "Catholic Sisters,” and "Catholic 
Lay Women.” Radio Tokyo in announcing 
their arrival in Manila, said, "The section is not 
restrained in its work by any theory of the 
separation of church and state.” ,To the Japa¬ 
nese, religion was merely another element, to be 
furthered, or persecuted, at the will of the military. 

One of the goals of the Religious Section was to 
nationalize the churches. Radio Tokyo reported 
in April 1944 that members of the Religious Sec¬ 
tion are "doing their best to further consolidate 
the various religious bodies into one strong 
Christian sect.” 

Among other things, the Japanese decreed that 
sermons of all clergymen must conform to rules 
outlined by the Religious Section. This meant 
supporting some phase of the policies of the 
central government, or paying lip service to the 
benefits of Greater East Asia. 

In this, as in other phases of the occupation, 
the Japanese attempt to win the cooperation of 
the Filipinos failed because the Japanese Military 
Government’s treatment of the Filipinos gave the 
lie direct to their cultural and political propa¬ 
ganda. 



Occupied China and Manchuria 

The pattern of Japanese exploitation in China 
followed that set earlier in Manchuria, where 
the invaders have been in occupation since 1931. 

From the beginning, the Japanese recruited 
labor battalions by force, on the basis of assess¬ 
ments from each village and each household. 


9 





These forces have been used to construct military 
installations, such as airfields, railways, and high¬ 
ways. It has been a common practice to send 
such labor units away from home. 

Besides the labor units, the various puppet 
regimes in Occupied China maintain their own 
armies. These have been used in fighting the 
Chinese guerillas, have acted as police, served as 
guards on trains, and as coastal patrols. 

Economic Exploitation 

In all economic matters, Japanese are favored 
over Chinese. In the matter of rationing, for 
example, Japanese in Occupied China get larger 
rations than the Chinese—at half-price. Where 
food of two qualities is available, the Japanese 
get the higher grade. This is the case with Saigon 
rice, which goes to the Japanese, while the Chinese 
are left to divide the available local grain adul¬ 
terated with peanut shells and ground bean cakes. 

Chinese farmers are subject to crop control. 
The farmer’s needs count for nothing. He must 
grow what is wanted by the Japanese—soybeans 
instead of wheat, for example—and he must grow T 
an amount set by his quota. Drastic penalties 
are imposed if the farmers in the district fail to 
meet their quotas. In some places the Japanese 
demand from one-fourth to one-third of the crop. 
In addition to the quotas the Japanese buy up, 
confiscate or seize for taxes all available wheat, 
rice, cotton, and livestock. 

Restrictions have been placed on trade under 
which one part of Occupied China can trade with 
another only under strict controls. Such economic 
transactions take place under great difficulties in 
any case, since the country has been flooded with 
unbacked currency. Not one but several occu¬ 
pation currencies are used—and there are penalties 
for those who do not use them. In order to help 
gain circulation for the occupation currencies the 
Japanese conducted an organized campaign to 
discourage the circulation of Chinese Government 
currency. ’ At first, the Chinese Government cur¬ 
rency was systematically and progressively de¬ 
valued by edict. When its value had been re¬ 
duced almost to zero (except in the black market) 
the Japanese forbade anyone to have Chinese 
Government currency in his possession. 

Japan has established not one but four puppet 
governments in Occupied China. They are: 

The Manchurian Government, headed by the 
puppet Henry Pu-yi, pretender to the 
"throne” of China; 


The North China Political Council at Peiping, 
headed by the puppet Wang Yin-tai; 

The Nanking government, headed by the 
puppet Chen Kung-po; 

The Federated Autonomous Mongolian gov¬ 
ernment, headed by the puppet Prince Teh. 

The Nanking government was originally estab¬ 
lished bv a renegade from the Chinese National 
Government (Chungking) named Wang Ching- 
wei. Wang died in Japan in November 1944 
after a long absence from China. 



Dope Peddling 

Dope has been one of Japan’s major weapons of 
war in Occupied China. The Japanese have de¬ 
liberately increased the production and consump¬ 
tion of opium, heroin, and cocaine with the hope 
of narcotizing the Chinese people into acquies¬ 
cence to the Japanese rule—and for a profit. 
Under Japanese stimulus, opium production has 
increased in Inner Mongolia and in Occupied 
North China. Opium shops are flourishing in 
Occupied China and protection fees are paid to 
the puppet governments and to the Special Serv¬ 
ice Bureau of the Japanese Army. In one street 
in Peiping, eight blocks long, there were two 
opium shops in June 1937. By the fall of 1939 the 
same street had 147 opium shops. 

Both education and religion have been turned 
to use by the Japanese. The Japanese now con¬ 
trol all educational institutions. Japanese is the 
only foreign language permitted. Chinese text¬ 
books have been rewritten to suit Japanese pur¬ 
poses. Only Japanese-approved studies are per¬ 
mitted in the curriculum. In the universities the 
scholastic standards have been lowered. Western 
ideas are being replaced by philosophies which are 
"clearer” on the right relationships between gov¬ 
ernor and governed. 

It is plain to see that the true pattern of Japa¬ 
nese occupation is intended to result in the "Japa- 
nization” of China. This is the real meaning of 
Greater East Asia. 

Japan's New Order 

These examples have been chosen because they 
show, in typical form, the wide gap between 
Japan’s real war aim and the statement of it for 
propaganda purposes. 


10 




The lesson for Americans in all this is simple 
and direct. Do not underestimate the Japanese 
enemy. He is ruthless, crafty, and organized on 
the model of a tight, totalitarian state. He is 
cannily capitalizing on proindependence and anti¬ 
imperialist sentiment throughout the whole of 
East Asia. He has stripped the countries of 
Occupied Asia without any regard whatsoever 
for the needs of their people. 

In the meantime we should all remember that 
State Shinto, the national cult which all Japanese 
are required to practice, holds three fundamental 
beliefs: 

1. The emperor is divine because he is the 
living extension in time of the very bodies and 
soul of the great divine ancestors of the past, 
and, in particular, of the physical and spiritual 
attributes of the Sun Goddess. 

2. Japan is the "Land of the Gods.” The 
Japanese islands are the offspring of the sky- 
father and the earth-mother, and hence are 


divine, while the rest of the world was made much 
later out of sea water and mud. The Japanese 
are, therefore, of divine nature and of special 
concern to the gods. 

3. J apan has a sacred mission to save the world. 
Hence the slogan of Hakko-Ichiu, "The Whole 
World Under One Roof.” This means that the 
Gumbatsn are supported by the doctrine of 
the national cult when they say that Japan’s 
leadership in bringing about a universal reign of 
peace must be recognized, and will be accomplished 
through the agency of her military power. 

The idea »f divine conquest, the power of the 
political clique which seeks conquest, and the 
ability of the Japanese army and navy to wage 
war must all be eliminated before any country in 
the world is safe from Japanese aggression. 
Japan’s unconditional surrender, as stated in the 
Cairo Declaration, is a necessary first step to 
protect our own national future and secure a 
peaceful Asia. 


11 




THE FORGER OF THE SWORD: 

JAPAN'S INDUSTRY 


Development and Structure of Japan's 
Industry 

Like her army and navy, most of Japan’s 
modern industry is of comparatively recent 
growth. The greater part of her industrializa¬ 
tion has taken place within the past 30 years. 
This industrial development was brought about 
by a national plan and was paid for by heavy 
government subsidy. 

Japan’s industry is an organic outgrowth of the 
nation’s feudal-totalitarian organization. It is 
built on feudal lines and dominated by a small 
number of family groups. These trusts, the 
largest of which are Mitsui and Mitsubishi, are 
vast industrial empires controlling raw material, 
factories, shipping, banking and finance, commer¬ 
cial establishments, and distributing agencies. 

These holding companies were formed as 
family trusty Executives, who may never own 
any part of the firm, are often taken from outside 
the owning clans, trained by and for the firm, 
and thoroughly indoctrinated with the same Sense 
of clan loyalty as were the samurai of the middle 
ages. 

Japanese Industry Geared for War 

Japan’s industrial plant has been geared to 
turn out all of her war needs, from wire nails to 
battleships. In a remarkably short period, and 
by dint of enormous expenditure of wealth and 
self-sacrifice on the part of the Japanese masses, 
she achieved a large degree of self-sufficiency in 
the inner Empire, consisting of North China, 
Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, and Japan proper. 
Within this inner citadel, Japan ha6 extensive 
deposits of strategic raw materials, large sources 
of hydroelectric power, factories, and a deep well 
of cheap labor. 


Japan's Industrial Manpower 

Japan’s "Inner Empire” contains about 152,- 
000,000 people, more than the population of the 
United States. There are 75,000,000 in Japan; 
45,000,000 in Manchuria; 32,000,000 in Korea, 
Formosa, and various islands. These figures do 
not include parts of China now being exploited 
by Japan, nor the millions in the rest of occupied 
Asia—Malaya, Burma, and the Indies. 

Inside Japan proper, reliable statistics showed 
35 million persons to be gainfully employed early 
in the war. About half of these were in agricul¬ 
ture and fishing, and only about 20 percent, or 
7 million, were in industry and mining. These 
people worked an average of 11.4 hours a day, 
exclusive of all rest periods, and had only 2 days 
off a month. 

Manpower from subjugated areas is being 
drafted into Japan to supplement her native labor 
force. In 1940, over 1 million Koreans were em¬ 
ployed in Japan and an estimated 100,000 are 
added yearly from this single source. 

In Manchuria, North China, and Korea, Japan 
is rapidly expanding her industrial and mining 
operations. However, there are no reliable statis¬ 
tics from those regions. 

Raw Materials and Resources 

The present war has given Japan access to 
some of the best sources of strategic raw materials. 
She took these sources, denying them to us, and 
for 3 years now, has been carrying raw material 
back to her Inner Empire, either for manufacture 
or stock piling. 

When the United Nations cut the land and sea 
supply lines leading from this raw materials 
treasure house to Japan’s industrial maw, Japan 
will lose access to her major oil supply, to rubber, 


12 


to import sources of manganese, chromium, lead, 
copper, nickel, zinc, and aluminum. From that 
moment she will have to fight from her stock piles. 
How large these have grown it is difficult to say 
with accuracy. However, she will still have close 
• at hand many other sources of raw materials, and 
will be able to replace a portion of those lost by 
the use of substitutes and by synthetics. 


Coal 



Japan has fairly large coal resources in the home 
islands, although there is a lack of coking coal for 
the manufacture of steel. However, Manchuria 
and Occupied China now fill at least 10 percent 
of Japan’s coal needs, and a large part of this coal 
is good coking quality. 



Iron and Steel 

Japan has had accessible supplies of iron ore 
and other materials for ferro-alloys. Iron ore 
from the home islands is low grade. In the past 
Japan has imported at least a third of her pig-iron. 
Better grade ores are available from China and 
Japan also imports from Manchuria and Korea. 
With these ores, Japan could produce about 
12,600,000 tons of steel a year. 



Oil 

Japan’s maximum wartime consumption of oil 
products is estimated at approximately 55 million 
barrels a year. Her home production of natural 
crude is placed at about 3 million barrels. Be¬ 
tween 15 million and 22.5 million barrels of syn¬ 
thetic oil could be produced each year in Japan, 
Korea, and Manchuria. 


Before our liberation of the Philippines, the 
difference between Japan’s production and con¬ 
sumption of oil was made up by imports from the 
conquered East Indies. Besides filling current 
needs, the East Indian oil fields were supplying 
Japan with fuel stock piles against such time as 
her outer communication should be cut. Military 
operations have reduced Japanese oil imports 
from the Netherlands East Indies. It is difficult 
to estimate just how much imports have been 
reduced, but there are indications that the reduc¬ 
tion is substantial. 

It is estimated that Japan’s stock pile of aviation 
gasoline would last 2 years at the present rate of 
operations. Her stock pile of naval fuel oil, how¬ 
ever, is believed sufficient for only 5 months of 
operations over the present huge area of her 
empire. Of course, as the area of her control is 
reduced by military operations, her fuel require¬ 
ments will also be reduced. 



Rubber 

When Japan occupied the island archipelagoes 
lying off southeast Asia she gained control of 90 
percent of the world’s supply of natural rubber. 
Japan has had 3 years in which to stockpile this 
essential war material. During all this time, 
however, shipping conditions have been difficult. 
There are indications that no sizeable stocks have 
been accumulated' in the home islands, although 
very large amounts accumulated in the southern 
regions. 



At present the North China railways are op¬ 
erating at about their prewar level—30 million 
tons per year. The Japanese have been working 
full speed to double-track the arc of coastal rail¬ 
ways that extend from China’s Yellow Sea ports 
to the east coast of Korea. This double-track - 


3 


646653 *- 


13 














ing, when complete, should increase the capacity 
of those sections by 150 percent. 

Japan's recent land campaign in China was 
designed, among other things, to clear the north - 
south railway that extends from Hankow to 
Canton, and extend it south to Indo-China. 



Electric Power 

Japan's modern industry is highly electrified. 
In 1943, it was estimated to have an installed 
capacity of 12.6 million kilowatts, more than half 
of it from water power. Use of electricity in 
private consumption is rigidly regulated, so that 
most of it is available for industrial purposes. 



Food 

Experts do not expect disruptive scarcity in 


Japan's food supply in the immediately forseeable 
future. There are shortages; the average daily 
intake has been reduced from 2,400 to 2,100 
calories per person. 

Rice supplies fully half of Japan’s caloric in¬ 
take, with fish and beans, in that order, forming 
the other two staples. Almost 94 percent of 
Japan’s total rice needs are raised on the islands 
themselves. Of the remainder, approximately 3 
percent comes from Korea and 3 percent from 
Formosa. In order to increase the rice supply 
and reduce vitamin deficiency diseases, Japan has 
prohibited the polishing of rice and is reported 
adding wheat, barley, millet, and beans to the 
food ration. Home production of rice has un¬ 
doubtedly suffered from the wartime shortage of 
fertilizers, manpower, and farm implements. 

The decrease in caloric intake has come about 
largely through the effect of wartime stringencies 
on Japan’s huge consumption of fish. It is 
estimated that this consumption has dropped by 
at least 50 percent. 

The soya bean provides proteins and vegetable 
oils for the Japanese diet. In recent years, Japan 
annually imported approximately million 

metric tons of beans from Manchuria. 


14 







The Japanese Soldier 

American soldiers know from hard-won experi¬ 
ence that the Japanese soldier is a ruthless, 
fanatical fighter. He accepts physical privation 
and the expectation of death without question, the 
result of his training, education, and political in¬ 
doctrination. His highest goal is to "keep the 
Emperor’s mind at ease,” and to attain it he is 
willing to lay down his own life. 

The typical Japanese soldier is hard, tough, and 
well disciplined. On the average he is 5 feet, 3 
inches tall and weighs 117/4 pounds. He is 
intelligent and crafty, not a stupid, insensate robot 
as he is sometimes pictured. The Japanese school 
attendance law requires every Japanese to go 
through the sixth grade with the result that the 
Japanese are a highly literate people. The years 
of schooling of the typical Japanese soldier are 
about the same as those of the typical American 
soldier. 

In his military training the Japanese soldier has 
been taught that his only choices are death or 
victory. He knows that if he is captured he will 
be officially listed as dead and so reported to his 
family. His officers tell him that to be captured 
is to be "Twice-Dead.” Rather than face dis¬ 
grace, the Japanese soldier will fight to the death. 

The Japanese soldier’s credo comes from 
Emperor Meiji’s Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and 
Sailors. It is this: "Duty is heavier than a 
mountain; Death is lighter than a feather.” 



Japanese Military Training 

Able-bodied Japanese begin their training at the 
age of 8 when they receive at least 2 hours drill 


each week. Between the ages of 14 and 15, they 
become army vouth soldiers and begin an appren¬ 
ticeship in military training. This qualifies them 
for the superior private rating when they become 
of age. Later they become lance corporals and, 
upon graduation from school, become corporals. 

Peacetime conscription calls for 2 years of 
military service for all physically and mentally fit 
males between the ages of 17 and 40. Today, a 
3-vear term of service is mandatory. 

The actual training is tough and realistic, in¬ 
tended to make the soldier withstand hunger, 
fatigue, privations. He is taught to master 
weapons, climate and terrain and, equally im¬ 
portant, is conditioned to unquestioning discipline. 



Organisation and Structure of the Japa¬ 
nese Army 

According to the Japanese constitution, the 
Emperor is the commander in chief of the army 
and navy. The Emperior declares war, makes 
peace, concludes treaties. In all this, he is 
advised by two military councils; the Board of 
Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the 
Supreme Military Council. 

The Japanese Army in the field is organized into 
groups of armies, area armies, armies, and forces 
with special missions—land task forces which do 
not initially come under the command of any 
specific army. 

The chief of staff of the Japanese Army is 
responsible for the general direction of army 
forces in the field. 


15 



A group of armies, such as the Kwantung Army, 
is equivalent to one of our commands of a theatre 
of operations. An area army, such as the Eighth 
Area Army, is equivalent to a British or American 
Army. 

A Japanese Army may be considered the equiv¬ 
alent of an American or British Army Corps. It 
is composed of a headquarters, a variable number 
of infantry divisions, and army troops. It nor¬ 
mally comprises from 50,000 to 150,000 officers 
and enlisted men. 

A Japanese infantry division is commanded by 
a lieutenant-general, with a colonel of the general 
staff as chief of staff. 

A Japanese "strengthened” infantry division 


consists of the following: 

Total personnel. 29,408 

Horses.'. 9,906 

Motor vehicles.. 502 

Rifles. 10,000 

Light machine guns. 405 

Heavy machine guns. 112 

Grenade dischargers. 457 

Machine cannon or 20 mm. antitank rifles. 72 

37 mm. or 47 mm. anti-tank guns. 40 

70 mm. regimental guns. 36 

75 mm. regimental guns. 24 

75 mm. field or mountain guns. 12 

105 mm. howitzers. 24 

150 nun. howitzers. 12 

Light tanks. 20 

Medium tanks. 48 

Tankettes or armored cars. 13 



Japanese Infantry Weapons 

Japanese weapons should not be underestimated. 
While they may not compare with our own in 
design, machining, or durability, they are still 
adequate and perform their combat function. 

The Japanese infantryman uses a 7.7 mm. 
rifle known as the M-99. This is an improved 
version of the older Arisaka model, weighs 
only 8.8 pounds, has a muzzle velocity of 2,300 
feet per second, and its sights are graduated 
from 300 to 1,500 meters. 

To date, a major Japanese weakness appears 


to be in her artillery, particularly in variety, con¬ 
centration, and marksmanship. However, since 
Japan has had access to German designs, it may 
be expected that Japanese artillery is due for a 
marked improvement. Japanese artillery weapons 
may soon be encountered which embody the fol¬ 
lowing features: Hollow charge projectiles, new 
incendiary projectiles, self-propelled mounts of 
various kinds, and rockets. 

Japanese tanks, too, are bound to improve and 
new models may show considerable German 
influence. That the Japanese tank design is not 
stagnant is clearly indicated by the recently 
captured new type amphibious tank, a definite 
advance over older models. 

Their aircraft too, are improving and, while 
they still cannot match our long-range bombers, 
their new fighter models can perform about as 
well as our own. 



Size of Japan's Army 

The Japanese Army today numbers at least 
4 million first-line troops, of whom more than 2 
million are in China and Manchuria. This army 
can still undergo considerable expansion if it 
becomes necessary. At this moment, Japan can 
mobilize and equip 2 million more soldiers without 
seriously affecting war production. In addition, 
Japan’s high birth rate supplies her with a large 
yearly quota of new recruits, and there are 
additional millions who might be "recruited” 
from subject nations. 

While United States troops have killed a mini¬ 
mum of 280,000 Japanese and isolated another 
250,000 in bypassed island pockets, we still have 
not yet come to grips with the main forces of 
Japan’s army. If past experiences are any indi¬ 
cation, defeating them will be a long, difficult, 
and costly task. 

a 1 -u - 



16 






















3 



OF THE SWORD: 
JAPAN'S NAVY 


Growth of Japan's fleet 

Currently, Japanese naval personnel totals 
850,000, afloat and ashore. Of this number. 
200,000 are manning ships; 200,000 are in naval 
aviation; 275,000 are in naval garrisons abroad: 
and the remainder is in Japanese \ards, garrisons, 
and communications centers. 

Among modern navies this is a mushroom 
growth. When Commodore Perr\ arrived in 
Yedo in 1853, Japan had no navy. But the 
Japanese learned quickly, and the importance of 
sea power in the modern world was not lost on 
them. By 1872 Japan had a small nav\ of 20 war¬ 
ships and 1,500 officers and men. This navv 
grew rapidly, built up b\ scores of ships pur¬ 
chased in France, the Netherlands, and England. 

In 1894 Japan's fleet was strong enough to 
challenge China. It had grown to 60,000 tons 
and was manned by 15,000 officers and men. In 
the 9 years between the defeat of China and the 
surprise attack on Port Arthur, Japan’s fleet 
tonnage had increased 500 percent to 300,000 tons 
aggregate, and her personnel had risen to 40,000 
officers and men. The victory over Russia, and 
the utter destruction of that nation’s fleet, estab¬ 
lished Japan, the newcomer to the field, as a 
naval power of the first rank. 

On October 10, 1941, when, according to a 
Japanese admiral, the Imperial Navy received 
sealed orders to deploy for the war agaiifst the 
United States, Japan’s Navy was the third largest 
in the world. It had an aggregate tonnage of 
1,049,148 tons and, in number of cruisers and 
aircraft carriers, was second only to the British 
Fleet. 

Losses in personnel 

Japanese naval losses (personnel) have reached 
262,000, it is estimated. Fully 25,000 members 
of the Japanese naval air corps are included in 
the total losses. 


Japanese naval personnel ashore, killed to date, 
is estimated to number 50,000. Fullv 10,000 
Japanese seamen have been killed on naval 
vessels damaged during the course of the war. 
Another 10,000 Japanese nav\ men have lost 
their lives in transit aboard naval troop ships 
while being carried to forward areas. 

The remainder of Japanese navy men killed is 
75 percent of the complement of Nipponese 
fighting vessels sunk to date. Jn view of the fact 
that the Japanese do not engage in life-saving 
operations if it interferes with activities on hand 
and that the United States Navy has captured 
only a few hundred Japanese sailors, the estimate 
of 75 percent of personnel lost is conservative, 
the United States Navy declares. 



The Japanese sailor 

The United States Nav\ rates the Japanese 
sailor a good fighting man, well-trained, well- 
educated, well-equipped. Japanese naval officers 
are cited as of high quality. Japanese seaman¬ 
ship is high; the naval vessels excellent. 

Of the Japanese sailor as a fighting man, a 
United States Navy report issued before the great 
naval actions of recent months has this to say: 

"The Japanese are taught to be aggressive, 
resolute, and daring. During the heat of battle, 
they fight without fear and once they are engaged, 
thev fight to the bitter end and are taught never 
to surrender to the enemy, even in the face of 
certain death. 

" Endurance .—The Japanese say that the loy- 
altv of officers and men enables them to endure 


17 







the hardships of a Spartan life at sea, and their 
men-of-war accordingly are combatant ships, 
even sacrificing some things which we consider 
basic necessities. 

"Loyally .—Training and education does much 
to bring to the front the devotion .of the Japanese ' 
to his Emperor and country. They revere the 
Emperor as God who is the head of the whole 
family. 

"Discipline .—The Japanese sailor is easy to 
command. They expect orders and feel unhappy 
when left to themselves. 

"Confidence .—Their morale is excellent, thanks 
to past victories in former wars and the initial 
successes after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese feel 
themselves, man to man, superior to any of us. 
They believe in their divine destiny to conquer 
the world. They are not discouraged by single 
battles. They are confident they will win the war. 

"Foresightedness .—The Japanese are prudent 
and careful. The war has been long planned with 
certain details taken care of years ago. They 
expect to conquer all of Eastern Asia and the 
Pacific Ocean and then force us to make a peace 
which will weaken us, and cause us to grow 
weaker with time.” 

The average Japanese sailor is about 20 years 
old, the youngest being just above the age of 14 
and the oldest now accepted for active sea duty 
being not above 41. This average sailor is 5 
feet 4% inches tall, weighs 124 pounds, has a 
chest measurement of 33 inches. Sailors, for the 
most part, derive from seaside communities. 
In peacetime, conscripts (40 percent) served 3 
years, volunteers (60 percent) 5 years and petty 
officers 6 years. Enlisted men were promoted 
through the ranks of petty officers to warrant 
officers. Since 1942, warrant officers have been 
eligible for advancement to both line and staff 
officers’ ranks. 

The Japanese Navy has not yet reached the 
bottom of the barrel with respect to manpower 
reserves. Navy recruiting can still draw on well 
over 1,500,000 men now engaged in merchant 
shipping and fishing. The present non-naval 
maritime population of Japan includes 115,000 
holders of mariners’ certificates, 250,000 holders of 
mariners’ service books. 

In 1937, Japan had 364,260 fishing boats, of 
which 66,299 had engines. Fishermen "discip¬ 
lined to the sea” total at least 1,250,000. 


Officers 

Admirals are appointed by the Emperor, after 
consultation with the Supreme War Council and 
the Navy Minister. Vice admirals, rear admirals, 
and captains are selected by the Board of Flag 
Officers. The selection system in these grades i6 
quite drastic. 

In the lower grades, selection boards comprised 
of flag officers and captains are convened in the 
fleet and in each naval district; these boards select 
the eligible officers in each command and deter¬ 
mine the relative seniority on the promotion list. 
The results are then submitted to the Board of 
Flag Officers, which then makes the final decision. 
Excellent officers are quickly promoted to the 
higher ranks. Even in peacetime, it is not 
unusual for an officer to become a commander at 
37, a captain at 41, a rear admiral at 45, a vice 
admiral at 49 and an admiral at 55. 

The major principles of Japanese naval educa¬ 
tion are as follows: Devotion to the Emperor, 
obedience to orders, courage, truth, and sim¬ 
plicity. 

Japan has three naval academies: The Im¬ 
perial naval academy at Etajima for line officers; 
the Imperial naval engineering academy at 
Maizuru; the Imperial naval paymaster’s academy 
at Tokyo. The Japanese rate these academies 
socially and professionally in the same order. 
Since the outbreak of this war, attempts have 
been made to eliminate this snobbery. The 
United States Navy observes, however, that there 
is continued social friction between the Japanese 
army and navy—friction that, at times, has prob¬ 
ably made the task of American forces easier than 
it might otherwise have been. 

Merchant marine officers .—Both the central 
government and various prefectural governments 
have taken an active part in the training of mer¬ 
chant marine personnel. Japan has 32 merchant 
marine schools, including 2 for navigation and 2 
for engineering officers. Prewar admission to the 
nautical training schools required the equivalent 
of a high school education and the passing of a 
difficult physical examination. 

Actual work in nautical schools ranged from 4 
to 7 years. After being graduated, students 
undergo 3 years of intensive training before they 
can qualify as officers of commercial ships. This 
training includes 6 months of work with the 
Japanese Navy, completion of which at once 
qualifies them as regular naval reserve officers; 


18 


1 year aboard nautical training ship; and 1% 
years aboard a regular commercial vessel, as mid¬ 
shipman under the vessel’s officers. Upon com¬ 
pletion of this program, the graduate is given a 
final examination before he is made an officer of 
the Japanese merchant marine. After serving 
from 2 to 3 years as a junior officer on commercial 
vessels, he is commissioned an ensign in the 
naval reserve. Since the beginning of the war, 
merchant marine officers have been ordered to 
active naval duty. 

Higher merchant marine schools .—There are two 
institutions of this nature, one in Tokvo and the 
other in Kobe. Both are administered bv the 
Government. At these two schools, students, in 
addition to receiving technical education to pre¬ 
pare them for the merchant marine, receive also 
a regular college education. Here also naval 
officers educate the students in naval matters. 
Upon graduation, the students are given commis¬ 
sions as officers in the merchant marine. After 
some additional naval training, they are also 
commissioned in the naval reserve. 

Japanese construction battalion. This outfit, 
corresponding to our "Seabees,” is 80 percent 
civilian, 20 percent military. A Japanese con¬ 
struction battalion has approximately 1,000 mem¬ 
bers. The men are trained and equipped to con¬ 
struct airfields, primarily. They are able also to 
construct roads, tunnels, and bridges. 


Underestimation by the West a Japanese 
Military Weapon 

When the history of this war is written, it will 
undoubtedly record that Western underestimation 
of Japan’s military power was one of the most 
potent weapons in the Japanese arsenal. Japan 
deliberately fostered this ignorance of her strength 
and intentions, using it as a screen behind which 
she mustered her forces for an all-out blow for 
conquest. 

In an incredibly short time Japan’s underrated 
army and navy chased the Western Powers out of 
East Asia and the Southwest Pacific, winning con¬ 
trol of a land and water empire measuring nearly 
5,000 miles from north to south, and more than 
3,000 miles from east to west. Within this huge 
conquered area resides a population of more than 
400 million people—almost one-fourth the total 
population of the world. 

A nation that can accomplish this military 
miracle, whose speed and scope are unparalleled 
in modern history, must never again be under¬ 
estimated. Japan will always be dangerous— 
especially so in retreat; capable of fanatical, unre¬ 
mitting resistance, and sharp, sudden surprises— 
until her army and navy, and the forces which 
created and nourished them for aggression, are 
totally destroyed. Until that moment, we relax 
at our own peril. 


19 


THE JAPANESE HOME FRONT 



Japan's Total Mobilization 

When Japan goes to war, all of her people in 
virtually all of their activities are at war. There 
is no such thing as "limited liability,” business as 
usual, or a division between home-front and war- 
front pursuits. The war front covers the entire 
national life, enveloping each activity, each indi¬ 
vidual. Each separate Japanese, in and out of 
the armed forces, is fighting and sacrificing for 
victory 24 hours a day. 

Total Rationing 

There is practically not a single article neces¬ 
sary to Japanese life and well-being that is not 
rationed, restricted, or otherwise controlled. The 
Japanese civilian accepts this situation because 
he knows that war needs come first, and what is 
left must be shared if it is to go around. 

Food 

All food is rationed in Japan. Not a single item 
can be freely bought. For an adult male doing 
light work, the daily rice ration is % of a pint of 
dry rice. The ration varies according to the sex, 
age, and occupation of the individual. Monthly 
rice allotments were reduced from 30 pounds per 
person in 1943 to 22.5 pounds in 1944. Fish, the 
second most important item in the Japanese diet, 
is increasingly difficult to obtain. Many fishing 
boats and fishermen have gone to war and the 
boats that remain are allowed only enough gaso¬ 
line to operate 4% days a month. 

The sugar ration has been reduced one-half 
pound per month and the vegetable ration is 
reported to‘be 4 pounds a month. 

All food is rationed to consumers under govern¬ 
ment control through Central and Local Food 
Corporations which are comprised of large dealers, 
food processing and handling groups. From this 


national food pool, the Central Food Corporation 
provides first for the needs of the armed forces, 
then sells the balance to the Local Food Corpora¬ 
tions. These local organizations distribute the 
foodstuffs through Neighborhood Associations, 
each of which serves 10 families, and whose 
president is appointed by the police. 

Because of the burdened transportation sys¬ 
tem, food distribution sometimes breaks down. 
One Japanese village had to stretch a 15-day rice 
ration for a month, and had no fish to fill in the 
gap. Adults in Aichi prefecture managed an 
entire month without sugar. In another locality, 
some residents had only tomatoes to eat for a 
week, in addition to a meager supply of rice. 

Because of inadequate food rations, many Japa¬ 
nese are forced to resort to the black market, 
where prices may be four times as high as legal 
ceiling prices. 

Clothing 

Clothing rationing is as widespread as that of 
food. Nearly every item of apparel was rationed 
as long ago as 1942. Since then, with the war 
effort requiring increasing amounts of cotton and 
other textiles, the clothing situation has become 
more difficult. The ration value of most items 
has consequently increased, and the quality, 
because of widespread use of synthetics, has 
deteriorated. Most newly manufactured cloth¬ 
ing in made from sufu, a synthetic textile that 
shreds after two or three washings. Leather is 
unavailable for civilian use, so shoes are made of 
cloth, fishskin, or paper, which fall apart after a 
good rain. Even wooden clogs are rationed. 

During 1944 three kinds of clothing ration 
cards were issued in two allotments, one for sum¬ 
mer, one for winter. There was a first-class 
ticket valued at 50 points for persons under 29 
years of age; a second-class ticket of 40 points for 


20 




persons over 30; and a ticket of varying values for 
special cases. 

That this clothing ration is hardly adequate to 
maintain a proper wardrobe is at once apparent 
from the following point values: Western stvle 
suit, 63 points; kimono, 40 points; woman’s 
blouse and skirt, 44 points; ravon dress, 32 points; 
workman’s coat, 43 points; child’s blouse and 
skirt, 22 points; long-sleeved undershirft, 15 
points, handkerchief, 3 points. 

Even blankets, towels, bedding and other home 
textile supplies are included in the meager ration 
allowance. 

Fuel und Other Rationed Goods 

In addition to food and clothing, virtually all 
other items of consumer’s goods are rationed. 
These include soap, matches, medicines, charcoal 
(Japan’s home heating fuel), and kerosene, to 
name a few. There is no coal for private use, and 
gas and electricity are not allowed for heating. 

Despite rent control measures, Tokyo rentals 
rose 150 percent between 1937 and 1943. Actu¬ 
ally, this increase is still higher than the rent 
index indicates, since repairs, which had pre¬ 
viously been paid for by landlords, must now be 
carried by the tenants. 

There is an acute housing shortage in Japan. 
This has been aggravated by the fact that, while 
about 150,000 of Japan’s flimsily constructed 
dwellings must be rebuilt each year, there has 
been practically no housing construction except 
in the large cities for the past 2 years. In addi¬ 
tion, the migration of Japanese to cities to take 
war jobs has increased the need for new houses to 
approximately 400,000 a year. 

Air raids have, of course, increased this short¬ 
age. We do not know the exact numbers. Our 
source is Radio Tokyo which may well be inter¬ 
ested in maximising reports of the damage. 
Ijiadio Tokyo in April 1945 made the following 
estimates of houses destroyed: 

Tokyo. 510,000 

Osaka. 130,000 

Nagoya. 60,000 

Kobe. 70,000 

Japan's Total Labor Draft 

Practically every Japanese able to work—man 
woman, and child—is actively engaged in fur¬ 
thering the war effort. Under the terms of Japan’s 
"Emergency Mobilization of National Labor’’ 
(the economic equivalent of military conscrip¬ 


tion), all males between the ages of 12 and 60, 
and all unmarried females between 12 and 40 
are registered with the labor exchange. Private 
hiring is no longer permitted. All placements 
are made through agencies of the Ministry of 
Welfare. 

Manpower needs are submitted to this Minis¬ 
try by the various war industries, and conscription 
notices are then sent out, calling up workers for 
service. 

Japanese conversion to war production has 
been just about complete. Men are forbidden 
to work in the 17 occupations classified as non- 
essential. Numerous restaurants, bars, theaters, 
geisha houses, and other places of amusement 
have been closed, their buildings converted into 
workshops and factories, and their personnel sent 
into war jobs. Public projects not contributing 
to the war effort have been suspended, and Japan’s 
civil service personnel has been cut by 5 percent. 

University departments, except those giving 
technical or military training, have been closed. 
Study hours have been concentrated so that 
students can work part-time in factories. 

Not only technical institutions, but many 
middle and even primary schools have been 
organized as workshops and turn out war goods. 
The Yokohama Technical School is making nuts 
under subcontract from the Nissan Motor Co., 
Sendai Higher Industrial School has subcontracts 
for the manufacture of munitions, and children 
in the Shimizu Primary School are making air¬ 
plane parts. 

Even religious teachers and priests—Shinto, 
Buddhist, and Christian—have doffed their robes 
to work in their nation’s armament industry. 

Wages and Living Costs 

While wages in Japan are low by western 
standards, they are supplemented with bonuses, 
sickness allowances, holiday gifts, dormitory or 
housing accomodations, "living-out” allowances, 
retirement and discharge pay. Consequently 
actual earnings are higher than the size of the pay 
envelope would indicate. 

The Welfare Ministry reported that compara¬ 
tively few workers in Tokyo received less than 
$34.50 (150 yen) per month, and that those who 
did get less received a government allowance of 
between 46 cents and $2.30 monthly for each 
member of the family who was under 18, or was 
crippled or infirm. 


21 






According to official figures, though, wages are 
not keeping pace with increasing living costs. 
Official prices and wages were frozen in 1939. 
Nevertheless they have responded to upward 
pressures. Between 1937, the year of the attack 
on China, and 1943, average Japanese living costs 
have risen 71 percent according to the Japanese 
Cabinet Bureau of Statistics. Food costs in this 
period have risen 77 percent and clothing costs, 
134.4 percent. 

Despite these difficulties, however, the Japanese 
worker has been steadily increasing his war effort. 

Civilian Defense and Evacuation 

Fully aware of the dangers of intensified Ameri¬ 
can air war, Japan is going all-out to reduce its 
interference with her war effort. In January 
1945, the Japanese Cabinet voted an air defense 
budget of $460 million to expand fire fighting and 
damage repair facilities, and construct permanent 
underground shelters. 

Drills are held regularlv in industrial and 
residential areas, and residents of metropolitan 
Tokyo must wear standard identification tags 
around their necks, giving name, address, and 
blood type. Fire breaks have been built in 35 
sections of Tokyo, shelter trenches have been dug 
along sidewalks, and essential materials such as 
food and fuel have been stored in places considered 
safe from air attack. The Tokvo branch of the 
Greater Japan Civilian Defense Association has 
set up food canteens in municipal mess halls. 

In addition to the official air defense agencies, 
practically every civilian has a job in civilian 
defense. The basic local civil defense unit is 
the 10-family neighborhood association, the chiefs 
of which comprise a community council. 

Compulsory evacuation of nonessential civilians 
has been carried out in Japan’s principal cities and 
industrial areas. Elderly persons, prospective 
mothers and small children were evacuated first. 
Those with relatives in rural areas were advised 
to join them and take up farming. Others were 
sent to government constructed evacuee shelters. 
Workers on war jobs, however, are urged to stay 
at their machines and keep producing even while 
raids are under way. 

Other Wartime Measures 

Travel in private automobiles is virtually non¬ 


existent, travel on trains drastically limited. 
Japanese mav not make railroad trips, even on 
urgent personal business, without a special police 
permit. 

Many autos, even official cars, are pow r ered by 
charcoal-burning engines to conserve gasoline. 

Telephone and telegraph facilities for private 
use are restricted to urgent business. 

Postal rates and taxes have been increased 

There has been a 50 percent price rise in all 
tobacco and tobacco products for public con¬ 
sumption. 

Evening newspapers are no longer published. 
Morning papers are limited to four pages. 

Local community branches of the National 
Total Stimulation Movement have been organ¬ 
ized to increase the Japanese fighting spirit, 
strength, war and food production, and spirit of 
self-sacrifice. 

Hardships Are the Path to Victory 

The Japanese are ready to undergo almost any 
suffering in defense of the "Imperial Throne.” 
They have already known 8 years of war, and 
today, despite increasing privations and the 
mounting tempo of Allied attack, the 75 million 
Japanese have lost none of their unity, their 
morale, their willingness to make even further 
Sacrifices for "victory.” 

Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State and 
former United States Ambassador to Japan, had 
this to say about Japanese morale: 

"Japanese civilians, although undergoing priva¬ 
tions and living under severe restrictions, are doing 
so willingly and energetically. Japanese men, 
women, and children are organized for war to an 
extent that we Americans, with our democratic 
tradition, find hard to understand. Japan’s low 
standard of living, stringent diet, and the long 
working hours to which her people are accustomed, 
make home front conditions that seem like priva¬ 
tions to us, appear only discomforts to the Japa¬ 
nese. The Japanese are a disciplined and regi¬ 
mented people. We must realize that behind the 
Japanese fighting man whom we are even now in 
the process of defeating, stands a determined foe, 
the Japanese civilian with whom we must also 
reckon before achieving eventual victory.” 




22 


PROBLEMS OF FIGHTING 
THE PACIFIC WAR 


Distance Is Also an Enemy 

Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief 
of the United States Fleet, has said that in the 
Pacific war we face two major opponents—The 
Japanese and distance. 

Space is an eater of time and resources, both 
essential to the successful conduct of warfare. 
The problems of conquering the vast Pacific 
spaces are a major concern of the military men 
who plan our operations and are responsible for 
the delivery of the right amounts of men and war 
implements to the right spot at the right moment. 

The nature of our war, its tempo and scope, has 
been determined by our ability to vanquish dis¬ 
tance—by the availability of transport and sup¬ 
ply, of ships to carry the assault troops and their 
battle gear, of tankers to deliver the rivers of oil 
and gasoline necessary to keep the fighting ships 
and planes and tanks going against the enemy. 

And as these distances grow with our continuing 
advance, more and more fighting ships and planes, 
and the men and supplies necessary to operate 
them, are expended on the purely defensive task 
of protecting our supply lines from possible enemy 
attack, removing these combat units from the 
actual battlefronts where they would otherwise 
increase the power of our attack. Thus the 
closer we draw’ to Japan, the greater becomes the 
attrition of distance. 

To one who has not actually participated in the 
Pacific operations it is difficult to comprehend the 
logistics problems created by the tremendous dis¬ 
tances, or to appreciate by what tenuous threads 
the fate of some of our campaigns have hung. 

Our forces, fighting at the end of the longest 
exterior communication lines in history, must 
maintain a ceaseless, mounting offensive against 
an enemy with ever-shortening lines of supply. 
And this enemy is ever ready to capitalize on any 
diminution of our offensive pressure through 
break-down of supply. 


Regular shipping routes in the Pacific, long as 
the\ normally arc, could not be used during the 
war because of the possibility that the enemy 
might sever them. Our wartime shipping had to 
be routed over newer, more distant lanes in order 
to keep it out of range of possible enemy action. 
These distances not only eat up time, but available 
shipping as well. 

Another shipping problem is the time a ship 
must remain in port. This is determined by the 
available loading and unloading facilities. Far 
Eastern ports are generally lacking in efficient 
cargo handling facilities, even in peace time. And 
the equipment of those we capture will very likely 
be destroyed by the retreating Japanese. 

When we invaded Europe, we had a well 
equipped base in England across a channel no 
w ider than the strip of water dividing Manila from 
Bataan. In the Pacific, our nearest home port 
to the Philippines is Pearl Harbor, more than 
4,000 miles away. Every ounce of equipment and 
every cartridge for every member of the landing 
force had to be carried over these thousands of 
miles of treacherous sea—and arrive on time. 

These problems will continue to increase in 
magnitude and complexity until we finally bring 
Japan to defeat. 

The Effect of Germany's Defeat 

The defeat of Germany brings no early solution 
to the problem of Pacific distances. Even if all 
transport shipping now serving the European 
theatre had been released to the Pacific immef* 
diatelv on VE day, 6 months would elapse before 
there would be any measurable effect in the 
Pacific operating areas. As a result, the Pacific 
war must be fought with the transport now in 
that ocean, plus every ton our shipyards can 
deliver in the meantime. 

The purely military task of defeating Japan is 
no less difficult than the task of defeating Ger- 



23 


many. It will require a corresponding quantity of 
materiel. Transport of these enormous supplies 
over the vast distances involved will require a 
shipping tonnage greater than the combined 
merchant fleets of the entire world before Pearl 
Harbor. 



Production and Logistics 

Production and prompt delivery of the myriad 
materials essential to the conduct of the war is 
the major consideration in the logistics of supply. 
Shipping presents only one facet of the problem. 

Obviously it is vital to offensive operations that 
the fuel, shells, food, and gear for ships, planes, 
guns, tanks, and men be on hand when needed. 
Because of the great distances and the critical 
shipping situation, all materials needed for 
Pacific operations must be ordered many months 
in advance of their actual use. Consequently any 
delay or failure, either in production or delivery 


of essential goods, may bring costly failure in 
battle. 

Coordination of our production is not enough— 
the entire national production and transport 
effort must be completely synchronized, with 
clockwork precision from factory and field to the 
battle front. 

Nothing in modern war is more complex than 
the amphibious operations peculiar to our war 
against Japan. Men and materiel must be trans¬ 
ported vast distances to the scene of combat, and 
be ready to go into action at an exact moment. 
The landing must be prepared by land-based and 
carrier plane bombing; by protracted shelling by 
surface forces; then finally comes the putting 
ashore of assault troops under the fire support of 
ships and aircraft. 

All these operations must be delicately balanced 
in plan, personnel and materiel preparation, and 
execution. Failure of any element to keep to 
an exact time schedule may easily endanger the 
success of the entire operation. 

And then, after all these obstacles—of produc¬ 
tion, shipping, distance, time, and synchroniza¬ 
tion—are overcome, there still remains the Jap¬ 
anese enemv. 


SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 


Japan's Main Forces Must Still be En¬ 
countered 

While the ultimate defeat of Japan is certain, 
her armed forces are as yet nowhere near final 
defeat. Japan will not be defeated until our 
will has been so completely imposed on the enemy 
that all Japanese have no further hope of victory. 
Until that moment is reached, any over-confi¬ 
dence on our part, any relaxation of the steadv 
intensification of our effort, might well be disas¬ 
trous. 

With but few exceptions, all of our military 
efforts so far have been directed toward the re¬ 
conquest of territory we had previously lost. 
Only at bloody Iwo and Okinawa have we touched 
Japan’s inner bastion. The unyielding fanati¬ 
cism of the enemy’s resistance there gives grim 
evidence of what we must expect as we draw 
closer to the centers of Japanese power. 


The Japanese Army has suffered serious set¬ 
backs, but actually our war against it is still 
in its opening phases. Nowhere have we met 
the main forces of the Japanese Army. Until 
recently we have encountered only outpost gar¬ 
risons. The bulk of Japan’s armed might is still 
fresh, confident and untouched by defeat. It is 
a large, tough, efficient fighting force stationed 
on the home islands, China, and Manchuria. 
It is this army that we will have to face and over¬ 
come after we have first won the gruelling, 
heartbreaking campaign to reach it. 



The Japanese Navy, too, has suffered serious 


24 












reverses and losses, but it still has to be decisively 
defeated. So far it has evaded decisive combat 
because, merely by remaining in being, it is able 
to pose threats to our overseas operations and 
communications. This compels us to use large 
naval and air forces for purely defensive and 
preventative operations, thus weakening our stra¬ 
tegic striking force. 

Japanese Civilians vs. U. S. Civilians 

In the final analysis, before our armed forces 
can defeat Japan’s armed forces in combat, our 
people must defeat Japan’s people in courage, 
staying ability and production. 

In the Japanese civilian we face a person whose 
entire history, culture and conditioning have 
fashioned him into an instrument of total war. 
He has a regimented mind, directly focused on 
victory. He is a skilled, resourceful worker, 
motivated by religious fervor. Long conditioning 
has made him willing to endure hardship, pri¬ 
vation, and hunger over a long period of time. 
And to him self-sacrifice is a cult that carries 
the blessings of his gods. His defeat will be no 
mean task. 

The Japanese Nation Fashioned for War 

Like the Japanese warrior and civilian, the 
Japanese nation has been fashioned for total war. 
This is no recent phenomenon, but the culmina¬ 
tion of a long process that reaches back into the 
dawn of Japanese history. All of her develop¬ 


ment, social, economic, cultural, religious, and 
political has led Japan into the path of attempted 
world conquest. The coalition of militarist, office 
holder, and industrialist— Gumbatsu —is the 
logical outgrowth of the grafting of modern tech¬ 
niques onto a feudal social organism. Like 
Nazism it is the result of a successful conspiracy 
and an effective reign of terror. All of which 
makes Japan’s fascism fundamentally dangerous 
and difficult to destroy. 

Japan Still Hopes to Win 

It may well be that Japan’s Gumbatsu over- 
lords by no means feel thev will lose the war. 
If they intended this as a war for limited objec¬ 
tives—for raw materials and pan-Asiatic prestige— 
an inconclusive defeat would still be a partial 
victory for them. By fighting on and on with 
relentless fanaticism, squandering the lives of their 
fighting men in prodigious quantities, they may 
hope to make the price we pay for each victory so 
great that ultimately our home and fighting morale 
will be shaken. 

Knowing how highly we value each American life 
—and' rating this a weakness—they might expect 
to bring us to the point where we will ask: "Is total 
victory worth this terrible cost?” Then, they 
feel, the prospect of still more American dead will 
make us willing to stop our war short of complete 
victory, and accept a Japanese surrender which 
will leave them some of their booty or, at least, 
leave some of the Gumbatsu free to plan again 
a greater, more devastating war of conquest. 


SELECTED READING ON JAPAN 


Borton, Hugh, Japan Since 1931 , Its Political and 
Social Development , New York, 1940. 

Borton, Hugh, Eliseef, Serge, and Reischauer, 
Edwin, A List of Selected Works on Japan, 
Washington 1940. 

B\as, Hugh, Government by Assassination, New 
York, 1942. 

Carus, C. D. and McNichols, C. L., Japan: Its 
Resources and Industries, New York, 1944. 

Colegrove, K. W., Militarism in Japan, World 
Peace Foundation, 1936. 

Cressey, George B., Asia's Lands and Peoples. 
A Geography of One-Third the Earth and Tuo- 
Thirds Its Peoples, New York, 1944. 


Elliot, C. N. E. and others, Japan, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 14th Edition, Vol. 12, pp. 893-954. 

Embree, John F., The Japanese, Washington, 
1943. 

Embree, John F., Suye Mura, a Japanese Village, 
Chicago, 1939. 

Fortune, Japan and the Japanese, April, 1944. 

Fortune, The Japanese Empire, September, 1936. 

Hauser, Ernest, Honorable Enemy, New York, 1941. 

Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Japan, 1931-1941, 2 Vol., Depart¬ 
ment of State, 1943. 

Holtom, D. C., Modern Japan and Shinto National¬ 
ism, Chicago, 1943. 


25 


Holtom, D. C., The National Faith of Japan, a 
Study in Modern Shinto, London, 1938. 

Hossumi, Nobushige, Ancestor-Worship and Eco¬ 
nomic Life in Japan, Chicago, 1937. 

The Japan Year Book , Tokyo, annually to 1940. 

Lamott, Willis, Nippon: The Crime and Punish¬ 
ment of Japan, New York, 1944. 

Lattimore, Owen, Solution in Asia, New York, 
1945. 

Maki, John M., Japanese Militarism, Its Cause 
and Cure, New York, 1945. 

Nasu, Shiroshi, Aspects of Japanese Agriculture, 
a Preliminary Survey, New York, 1941. 

Norman, E. Herbert, Japan s Emergence as a 
Modern State, 1940. 

Orchard, J. E., Japan's Economic Position, the 
Progress of Industrialization, 1930. 

Quigley, Harold, Japan: Government and Politics, 
1932. 


Reischauer, R. K., Japan: Government and 
Politics (1939), 1939. 

Sansom, Sir George, Japan: A Short Cultural 
History, 1943 (revised ed.) 

Smith, G. H., and Good, Dorothy, Japan: A 
Geographical View, New York, 1943. 

Tolischus, Otto, Through Japanese Eyes, New 
York, 1945. 

Trewartha, Glenn Thomas, Japan: A Physical, 
Cultural, and Regional Geography , Madison, 
1945. 

Young, A. Morgan, Imperial Japan 1926-1938, 
New York, 1938. 

Young, A. Morgan, Japan in Recent Times, New 
York, 1929. 

Young, A. Morgan, The Rise of a Pagan State, 
New York, 1939. 


A FEW CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES WHERE ADEQUATE LIBRARIES 
ON THE FAR EAST ARE TO BE FOUND 


The Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. 
The Library of Columbia University, New 
York. 

The New York Public Library, New York. 
The Library of the University of Pennsyl¬ 
vania, Philadelphia. 

Harvard University Library, Cambridge, 
Mass. 

Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn. 
The Library of the University of Chicago, 
Chicago. 

The Library of the University of Minnesota. 
Minneapolis. 


The Library of the University of W ashington, 
Seattle. 

The Library of the University of California, 
Berkeley. 

Institute of Pacific Relations, San Francisco. 
The University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati. 
Duke University, Durham, N. C. 

The Foreign Policy Association, New York. 

Library of the Carnegie Endowment, Wash¬ 
ington, D. C. 

The Library of the University of Colorado, 
Boulder. 


26 


EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S 
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS 
JUNE 1, 1945 

The primary task facing the Nation today is to win the war in Japan — 
to win it completely and to win it as quickly as possible. For every day 
by which it is shortened means a saving of American lives. 

But there can be no peace in the world until the military power of Japan 
is destroyed — with the same completeness as was the power of the Euro¬ 
pean dictators. 

To do that, we are now engaged in a process of deploying millions of 
our armed forces against Japan in a mass movement of troops and supplies 
and weapons over 14,000 miles — a military and naval feat unequalled in 
all history. 

The job ahead for this Nation is clear. 

We are faced with a powerful Japanese military machine. These are 
the same Japanese who perpetrated the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor 
three and one-half years ago; they are the same Japanese who ordered the 
death march from Bataan; they are the same Japanese who carried out 
the barbarous massacres in Manila. 

They now know that their dreams of conquest are shattered. They no 
longer boast of dictating peace terms in Washington. 

This does not mean, however, that the Japanese have given up hope. 
They are depending on America tiring of this war — becoming weary of 
the sacrifices it demands. They hope that our desire to see our soldiers 
and sailors home again and the temptation to return to the comforts and 
profits of peace will force us to settle for some compromise short of uncon¬ 
ditional surrender. 







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